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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT
This is an appeal from a Judgment in the Third Judicial
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, over
which the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate
jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter

pursuant to §78-2-2 (3) (j), Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1990).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
For the purposes of this Brief, Plaintiffs-Appellees Joseph
Edward McPherson and Joan Elissa McPherson will hereinafter be
referred to collectively as "McPhersons".

Defendant-Appellant

Vaughn Belnap will be referred to as "Vaughn Belnap" and his son
who is a co-Defendant, but who McPhersons were not able to serve
will be referred to as "Jeffrey Belnap".
1.

Whether the clear weight of evidence demonstrates the

trial Court erred in concluding that Vaughn Belnap entered into a
1

contract of bailment with McPhersons, that Vaughn Belnap and the
McPhersons entered into a relationship of bailee and bailor and
that McPhersons1 personal property was delivered to Vaughn Belnap
rather than Jeffrey Belnap, his son.
2.

Whether the clear weight of evidence demonstrates the

trial Court erred in concluding that the bailment created between
the McPhersons
benefit,

as

consequently,

and

Vaughn Belnap was a bailment

opposed

to

a

gratuitous

bailment

for mutual
and

that,

a standard of simple negligence, as opposed to

gross negligence, was applied.
3.

Whether the clear weight of evidence demonstrates the

trial Court erred in imposing a presumption of negligence on
Vaughn Belnap.
4.

Whether the clear weight of evidence demonstrates the

trial Court erred in concluding that Vaughn Belnap was negligent
and his negligence proximately caused the McPhersons1 injuries.
5.

Whether the clear weight of evidence demonstrates the

trial Court erred in concluding that Vaughn Belnap failed to
rebut the presumption of negligence.
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The combined issues of law and fact each require a review of
the finding of fact.

The standard of appellate review requires

that Vaughn Belnap marshall the evidence in support of the trial
court findings and demonstrate that despite this evidence, the
trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be against
the clear weight of evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous.
2

STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE
There

are

ordinances,

no

rules

constitutional
or

regulations

provisions,
whose

statutes,

interpretation

is

determinative of the issues on appeal in this matter.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In August, 1988, Vaughn Belnap purchased a home from the
McPhersons.

Thereafter,

in or about

September,

1988, after

moving out of the home purchased from them by Vaughn Belnap, the
McPhersons leased a condominium unit owned by Vaughn Belnap.
(Trial Transcript p. 6, lines 8-16).

The Lease Agreement was for

a six month period of time from September, 1988 to February,
1989.

(Trial Transcript p. 7, lines 3-8).
In

late

November,

1988,

Vaughn

Belnap

contacted

the

McPhersons and indicated to them that he had a buyer for the
condominium unit he was leasing to them.

Vaughn Belnap requested

that the McPhersons move out immediately as an accommodation to
him.

(Trial Transcript, p. 7, lines 24 - p. 8, line. 11).
Because of the short notice, the only alternative lodging

the McPhersons could obtain was a furnished apartment.
McPhersons1

next

meeting

with Vaughn

Belnap,

In the

the McPhersons

indicated to Vaughn Belnap that they could vacate the condominium
unit, however, the only alternative lodging that they could find
was a furnished apartment, therefore they had no room to store
their furniture which was currently in the condominium unit.

The

McPhersons further indicated that they would have to find a place
to store their furniture before they could vacate the premises.
3

(Trial Transcript p. 12, lines 12 - p. 10, lines 25).

Vaughn

Belnap responded by disclosing to the McPhersons that Jeffrey
Belnap, Vaughn Belnap1s son, was the individual who allegedly
agreed to purchase the condominium unit from him.

Vaughn Belnap

further stated that as Jeffrey Belnap had no furniture, it would
be all

right

if the McPhersons left their furniture

in the

condominium unit until such time as they moved the furniture to
their permanent lodging.

(Trial Transcript, p. 10, lines 5-22;

p. 32, lines 1-13).
McPhersons advised Vaughn of their concern about the safety
of their property while it was in the condominium unit.

Vaughn

Belnap stated to the McPhersons that the furniture would be fine.
(Trial Transcript, p. 73, lines 10-16).
The

McPhersons

dealt

exclusively

regarding storage of the furniture.

with

Vaughn

Belnap

(Trial Transcript, p. 10,

lines 5-25; p. 11 lines 18 - p. 12, lines 7; p. 14, lines 6-14;
p. 32 lines 1-13).
Approximately ten to eleven days after being informed that
the condominium unit was allegedly sold, McPhersons vacated the
condominium unit leaving a number of items of personal property
in the unit.

After the McPhersons vacated the condominium unit,

Jeffrey Belnap allegedly moved into the condominium unit, not as
a purchaser but allegedly as a tenant.
ins. 5-17).

(Trial Transcript, p. 64,

After vacating the condominium, McPhersons no longer

had access to the condominium unit.

McPhersons did not have keys

or any other way to obtain free access to their furniture to the
4

inside of the condominium.

In order to gain access to the

property in the condominium unit, they contacted Vaughn Belnap.
(Trial Transcript p. 35, line 19 - p. 36, line 4.
In early December of 1988, McPhersons ran into Vaughn Belnap
at

an

automobile

dealership

in

Salt

Lake.

At

that time,

McPhersons indicated to Vaughn Belnap that they had a found an
unfurnished condominium to move into and that they wanted to
pick up their furniture.

(Trial Transcript p. 15, line 18 - p.

16, line 5).
The next day, a message was left at McPhersons1 office by
Vaughn Belnap that indicated that the property that was stored at
the condominium unit had been stolen.

The furniture and other

items of personal property owned by McPhersons and left in the
condominium

unit were reported

stolen on December

15, 1988.

(Trial Transcript, p. 16, line 6 - p. 17, line 18).
On December 15, 1988, a neighbor saw a pickup truck occupied
by

two

men

loaded

condominium unit.

with

furniture

parked

in

front

of

the

The neighbor could identify neither Vaughn

Belnap nor Jeffrey Belnap as occupants of the truck.
Transcript, p. 55, ins. 11-25; p. 56, ins. 104).

(Trial

The police

officer investigating the crime found no evidence of forcible
entry.

He

further

indicated

circumstances looked suspicious.

that

in

his

opinion

the

(Trial Transcript, p. 46, lines

1-6 and p. 47, lines 1-25).
Vaughn Belnap testified that he lived in the condominium
unit prior to the time it was occupied by McPhersons.
5

Vaughn

Belnap

further

testified

that

at the

time he

lived

in the

condominium unit, the doors were equipped with dead bolt locks.
(Trial Transcript, p. 68, lines 21 - p. 69, line 8).
Jeffrey Belnap testified that even though it had been over
18 months, he remembered locking the door on the date of the
robbery.

(Trial Transcript, p. 51, line 20 - p. 52, line 10).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

1.

The trial Court found that McPhersons1 property was

placed in the possession and control of Vaughn Belnap.

Vaughn

Belnap, in an effort to avoid liability, claims there is no
evidence

to

support

the

trial

evidence

shows that McPhersons

Court's

findings.

In fact,

dealt exclusively with Vaughn

Belnap and not his son, Jeffrey Belnap, with respect to the
storage of the property.

Evidence shows that the agreement

entered into between the parties was between Vaughn Belnap and
the McPhersons and that Vaughn Belnap later turned control of the
property over to his son Jeffrey Belnap.

Finally, the facts show

that Vaughn Belnap was the sole owner of the condominium unit at
the time the property was stored and that in order to gain access
to the property, the McPhersons contacted Vaughn Belnap.

Thus,

the evidence supports the trial Court's finding that a baileebailor

relationship

existed

between

Vaughn

Belnap

and

the

McPhersons.
2.

Vaughn Belnap further claims that the trial Court erred

in finding that the bailment agreement entered into between the
parties was a bailment for mutual benefit.
6

Contrary to Vaughn

Belnap1s

contention,

the

clear

evidence

supports

the

trial

Court's finding that the bailment was for the mutual benefit of
the parties.

Both parties testified and it is undisputed that

the McPhersons1 agreement to move from the condominium unit prior
to the expiration of the lease benefitting Vaughn Belnap by
allowing

him

to

proceed

with

an

alleged

sale.

The

facts

demonstrate that in order to make it possible for the McPhersons
to move out, Vaughn Belnap agreed to store their furniture until
such time as they had accommodations that could facilitate the
furniture.

This bailment agreement benefited both Vaughn Belnap

and the McPhersons, therefore, it was a bailment

for mutual

benefit.
3.

A presumption of negligence may be imposed on bailee

when the bailee has exclusive possession and control of the
bailed goods at the time of delivery.

Vaughn Belnap claims there

is no evidence which supports the trial Court's conclusion that
at the time the property was delivered, it was delivered to the
exclusive possession of Vaughn Belnap.

However, the evidence

shows the McPhersons entered into an agreement with Vaughn Belnap
and not Jeffrey Belnap to store the furniture in the condominium
unit and the furniture was left with Vaughn Belnap.

Only after

the property was delivered to the exclusive possession of Vaughn
Belnap did Vaughn Belnap turn over the care of the property to
Jeffrey

Belnap.

Vaughn Belnap should not be able to escape

liability for property that turned over to his possession by
subsequently turning over the care and security of the property
7

to his son Jeffrey Belnap.
4.

Vaughn

presumption

Belnap

finally

contends

that

even

if

the

of negligence was correctly imposed by the trial

Court, through the clear weight of evidence, he rebutted that
presumption.

The only evidence that Vaughn Belnap can point to

to support his claim is that he locked the doors and windows on
the condominium when he lived in the condominium unit prior to
the time the McPhersons leased the unit from him.

Further,

Vaughn Belnap1s son, Jeffrey Belnap, testified that even though
it had been over 18 months since the date the property was
allegedly

stolen,

particular day.
presented

was

he

remembered

locking

the

doors

on

that

Thus, the only evidence that Vaughn Belnap
a

self-serving

statement

of his

son, Jeffrey

Belnap, that the doors and windows were locked when he left the
premises on that particular day.
failed

to

present

any

As is evident, Vaughn Belnap

evidence

sufficient

to

rebut

the

presumption of negligence.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S
RULING THAT A CONTRACT OF BAILMENT WAS
ENTERED INTO BETWEEN THE MCPHERSONS AND
VAUGHN BELNAP

A.

Aplicable Law

In order to establish the existence of a bailment agreement,
the following facts must be shown:
to the bailee; (2)
bailee; and (3)

(1)

Deliver of the property

acceptance of exclusive possession by the

an agreement that the property will be returned
8

to the bailee at the expiration of the bailment.
Haus Hortence, Inc., 472 N.E.2d 593

(1984).

Wright v. Auto
As stated in 8

C.J.S., §1 "A bailment is consensual relation that includes, in
its broadest sense, any delivery of personal property and trust
for a lawful purpose".

Id. at 314. The assumption of control is

a determining factor:
[A] bailee is one who receives personal property
from another in trust for a specific purpose, with a
contract, express or implied, that the trust shall be
faithfully executed and the property returned or duly
accounted for when the special purpose is accomplished.
8 C.J.S. Bailments, §1, p. 321.
Where there is a change or acceptance of possession depends
on whether there is a change or acceptance of actual or potential
control in fact over the subject matter.
483 P.2d 1282, 1286 (Wash. App. 1971).

Collins v. Boeing Co,,
As stated by the Oregon

Court of Appeals in Jackson v. Miller, 598 P.2d 1255 (OR. App.
1979):
Possession is defined to include the intent to
exercise control over goods.... The intent to possess
to assume custody or control over an object, is
generally regarded as important an element of
possession as actual physical control. Given exactly
the same relation to an object, the person may or may
not be held to be in possession thereof, according to
whether or not he had the intent to exercise control
over it.
(Citing Brown, Personal Property, §10.3
(217).
Id at 1257.
The trial Court in its Findings of Fact found as follows
with

respect

to the agreement

between McPhersons

and Vaughn

Belnap:
2.

In or about December, 1988, during the term of
9

the lease, Vaughn Belnap had the opportunity to sell
the condominium.
Vaughn Belnap asked Plaintiffs if
they would be able to vacate the condominium as soon as
possible as he had found a buyer for the property.
Plaintiffs agreed to vacate the condominium to
accommodate the sale, as long as Vaughn Belnap would
let them leave the furniture in the condominium until
such time as they could locate a residence which would
accommodate their furniture. Vaughn Belnap agreed to
this condition and stated that the furniture would be
of a benefit to him because his son, Jeffrey Belnap,
who was in the midst of a divorce proceeding, could use
the furniture.
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law R. 202, Para. 2). Based
on this finding of fact, the trial Court found that Vaughn Belnap
and McPhersons entered into a contract of bailment, that they
therefore stood in a relationship of bailee and bailor and the
McPhersons1 personal property was delivered to Vaughn Belnap and
his son Jeffrey Belnap.

(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law, R. 203, Para. 7; 204, Para. 1).

As stated by the trial

Court in its Memorandum Decision dated September 14, 1990:
The Court has concluded under the fact situation a
bailment was created.
Plaintiffs delivered to
Defendant Vaughn Belnap not Jeffrey Belnap, the
furniture, with the express understanding the furniture
would be returned to Plaintiffs.
B.

1.

The Evidence Supports The Trial Court's
Finding That Bailment Was Entered Into
Between McPhersons And Vaughn Belnap.
Vaughn Belnap in his Brief maintains that the evidence

does not support the trial Court's finding that a bailment was
entered into between McPhersons and Vaughn Belnap.

However, as

will be shown below, the trial Court's findings are supported by
the evidence of the case.

The following evidence supports the

trial Court"s conclusion that a bailment was entered into between
10

Vaughn, It was Vaughn who had purchased our home. It
was Vaughn with which I had developed a comfort zone
with, and it was basically it. I was going off the
assurances that his son was responsible and would take
care of the property.
(Trial Transcript, p. 11, line 12 - p. 12, line 4).
c.

After being questioned by the Court, Edward McPherson

stated as follows regarding his conversation with Vaughn Belnap
at the time Vaughn agreed to store McPherson's furniture:
The witness: When we were talking we said we were
going to have to find a place for the furniture. At
that time he said that his son had no furniture when he
was just going through a divorce, and, you know, if we
wanted to leave the furniture, that would be fine until
we could find a permanent place for it, because —
this thing was a very inconvenient thing for everyone
involved.
The Court:

What did you say?

The witness:
I said that was fine.
The only
thing we were concerned about was, you know, whether or
not Jeff would take care of the - - you know be
responsible for the furniture, I mean take care of it.
(Trial Transcript, p. 14, lines 7-20).
d. In rebuttal to Defendant's testimony, Edward McPherson
testified as follows regarding the agreement between the parties:
Q:

And how did - - what did Mr. Belnap state to

you?
A: He said that it would probably be fine. We
were - - I was looking to Vaughn because I did not know
his son. Vaughn had just purchased the place from me.
Vaughn owned the condominium and it was Vaughn I was
looking to for security, because had it not been for
Vaughn I would never have left the property at the
house with his son.
(Trial Transcript, p. 73, lines 14-22).
2.

In

addition

to

the

evidence

already

recited,

the

following evidence support the trial Court's finding that Vaughn
12

McPhersons and Defendant Vaughn Belnap:
a.

On direct examination, Joseph McPherson testified as

follows regarding circumstances regarding his decision to leave
his furniture with Vaughn Belnap:
Q:
Did you, after initial contact with Mr.
Belnap, did you speak with Mr. Belnap again regarding
this matter?
A:
We did. I believe he was - - I believe we
spoke to him at the condominium, 902 West New Hampton,
and told him that, you know, we had found a place but
it was furnished and now we had to do something with
our furniture. And he indicated at that time that his
- - it was his son - - it would be his son moving in
and he was just getting divorced and he had no
furniture. And so it was - - you know, he said, well,
he wouldn't mind if that was left there, he would take
good care of it. I was concerned because the furniture
we had was very expensive, very nice furniture, and I
was a little uncomfortable leaving that furniture
there.
But it was Vaughn, he was the person I was
dealing with because it was Vaughn who had bought our
house.
(Trial Transcript, p. 10, lines 5-22).
b.

As

to

Mr. McPherson's

understanding

regarding

the

agreement between him and Vaughn Belnap, and basis for that
understanding Edward McPherson testified as follows:
Q: Can you tell me what your understanding of the
agreement was that you had with Vaughn Belnap regarding
the storage of the furniture.
A: Well, we wanted to just - - the furniture was
just to be left there long enough until we could find a
permanent place to live.
Q:
Now, you stated before that it was your
understanding that the agreement was between you and
Mr. Belnap. What was the basis of your understanding?
A:
Well, being the basis - - the basis of the
understanding was that he furniture was just to be left
there long enough until we could find a place to live
and it was done with - - my whole dealings were with
11

Belnap had actual and/or constructive possession and control of
the bailed property.
a.

Vaughn Belnap was the sole owner of the condominium unit

at the time the property was stored;

(Trial Transcript, p. 37,

lines 4-15).
b.

McPhersons1 agreement with respect to storage of the

property was with Vaughn Belnap, not Jeff Belnap and McPhersons
dealt exclusively with Vaughn Belnap.

(Trial Transcript, p. 10,

lines 5-25; p. 11, line 18 - p. 12, line 7; p. 14, lines 6-14)
c.

McPherson did not have access to the furniture in the

condominium.

In order to gain access to the property that was

stored, McPhersons had to contact Vaughn Belnap or his son,
Jeffrey Belnap.

(Trial Transcript p. 35, line 19 - p. 36, line

4).
3.

The evidence supports the trial Court's conclusion that

Jeffrey Belnap was an agent, under the direction and control of
Defendant Vaughn Belnap.

(Trial Transcript, p. 10, lines 5-2 5;

p. 11 line 18 - p. 12, line 7; p. 14, lines 6-14; p. 32 lines 113).
4.

Edward McPherson on both direct and cross examination

testified jthat Vaughn Belnap, not Jeffrey Belnap agreed to allow
the McPhersons to store the furniture.

Edward McPherson on

direct examination stated as follows:
Q: Did you, after the initial contact with Mr.
Belnap, did you speak with Mr. Belnap regarding this
matter?
A:
We did, I believe he was - - I believe we
spoke to him at the condominium at 902 West New Hampton
13

and told him that, you know, we had found a place but
it was furnished and now we had to do something with
our furniture and he indicated at that time - - it was
his son, and - - it would be his son moving in and that
he was just getting divorced and he had no furniture
and so it was - - well, he wouldn't mind if that was
left there, he would take good care of it. (Emphasis
added).
(Trial Transcript, p. 10, lines 5-16).
Edward McPherson on cross examination testified as follows:
A: We found a furnished place because that was
our only option because of the circumstances
surrounding the whole movement of displacing us out of
a condominium which we had leased and which we were
willing to break in order to accommodate Vaughn. Then
we had indicated that now we needed a place for our
furniture, he indicated his son was getting divorced
and had no furniture, that it would be okay if we left
the furniture there until he found a permanent place to
live.
(Trial Transcript, p. 32, ines 4-13).
C.

Application Of The Law Of The Evidence.

Vaughn Belnap seeks to avoid liability

for the furniture by

claiming that an agreement was not entered into by him and the
McPhersons but his son and the McPhersons.

Accordingly, Vaughn

Belnap argues there is no evidence that he agreed to hold the
furniture for the benefit of the McPhersons or that he agreed to
return

the

furniture.

However,

the

fact

that

a

bailment

agreement entered into between McPhersonfs is supported by the
clear weight of evidence.
The facts show the condominium unit where the furniture was
stored was solely owned by Vaughn Belnap.

The facts show that in

order to induce the McPhersons to move out of the condominium
unit, Vaughn Belnap agreed to store their furniture until such
14

time as they had a place that could accommodate the furniture.
All the negotiations regarding storage of the furniture took
place between Vaughn Belnap and the McPhersons, Jeffrey Belnap
was not involved.

Further, the facts are undisputed that based

on Vaughn Belnap's assurances, the property was left in the
condominium unit with the understanding that the property would
be

returned.

McPhersons

Finally,

did

not

the

have

undisputed

access

to

facts

their

evidence

furniture

in

that
the

condominium unit and were required to contact the Belnaps in
order to gain access.

These facts clearly support the trial

Court's ruling that a bailment agreement was entered into between
Vaughn Belnap and McPhersons.
II.

THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S
FINDING THATTHE BAILMENT ENTERED INTO
BETWEEN THE PARTIES WAS A BAILMENT FOR
MUTUAL BENEFIT
A.

Applicable Law

Bailments traditionally

fall into three categories:

(1)

Bailment for the sole benefit of the bailor (also known as a
gratuitous bailment);
bailee; and

(3)

(2) Bailment for the sole benefit of the

Bailment for the mutual benefit of the bailor

and the bailee (also known as a bailment for hire or the bailment
for the mutual benefit of the parties).

(See e.g., Christensen

v. Hoover, 643 P.2d 525 (Colo. 1982); 8 Am Jur 2d Bailments, §17.
The standard of care imposed on a bailee depends on the nature of
the bailment.
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B.

The Evidence Supports The Trial Court's
Finding That Bailment Entered Into Between
McPhersons And Vaughn Belnap Was A Bailment
For Mutual Benefit,

With respect to the issue of the type of bailment entered
into between Vaughn Belnap and the McPhersons, the trial Court
found as follows:
The Court fully believes that [the] bailment was
for the mutual benefit of both parties. The Plaintiffs
accommodated Defendant Vaughn in furthering the sale of
the condominium by moving out prior to the expiration
of the lease and by allowing Vaughn Belnap to use their
furniture in furtherance of the sale of the condominium
to his son who had no furniture.
(Findings of Fact R. 203, Para. 8).
The following evidence supports the trial Court's finding
that the bailment was for the mutual benefit of both parties:
1.

As discussed above, the undisputed evidence shows that

after entering a Lease Agreement with the McPhersons for a period
of

six

months,

Vaughn

Belnap

contacted

the

McPhersons

and

requested that they move out of the condominium unit prior to the
expiration

of the lease

in order to allow him to sell the

condominium unit to a prospective buyer.

Edward McPherson in his

direct examination gave the following testimony:
Q: After you moved into the condominium unit, did
Mr. Belnap subsequently request that you vacate the
unit?
A:
He did, shortly - - shortly thereafter, he
notified us and said that he had gotten a buyer for the
condo and could we accommodate him by moving out. And
it was moving out early because we had just been there,
I believe only a couple of months.
Q: Do you know approximately what time that —
what the date was when he asked you to vacate the
premises?
16

A: I believe it was sometime towards the end of
November, beginning of December.
Q:
What happened
vacate the premises?

after he requested that you

A: Well, we were under the impression that it was
sold to an independent buyer, and at that time - - then
later we found out it was actually sold to his son,
that he was moving into the condo. I had no idea what
the agreements were then, but that we were trying to do
was be very helpful in trying to relieve Vaughn of some
of his debts, because he had just purchased a home from
us and he had a very large balloon payment due in a
year and a half and anything we could do to accommodate
him in making that easier, or making it easier for him
to sell his property - - we would do anything we could
do to accommodate him so that is why - - it was a
terrible inconvenience for us to move out on very short
notice. It was right during the holidays, it was, you
know, a busy time for me and it was just - - once we
found out - - I was a little bit irritated by the fact
that I found it was, you know, his son and that we were
inconvenienced, you know, having to move out so quickly
when it could have been done in a more reasonable time.
(Trial transcript, p. 7, line 25 - p. 9, line 8).
2.

Vaughn

Belnap

in direct

examination by Plaintiffs1

counsel admitted he benefited from McPhersons agreeing to move
out of the condominium unit which could only be accomplished if
he agreed to store their furniture.

Vaughn Belnap's testimony is

as follows:
Q: In or about September, 1988, did you lease a
condominium unit to Ed and Lisa McPherson?
A:

Yes I did.

Q: At the time you leased the condominium unit,
did you enter into a Lease Agreement with McPhersons?
A:

Yes.

Q:
Was that Lease Agreement
period of time?
17

for a six month

A: I believe it was from September 1st to the end
of February.
Q: September 1st of what year to February 1st of
what year?
A:

1988 to 1989.

Q: In or about late November or early December,
1988, did you contact the McPhersons regarding the
McPhersons moving from the condominium unit?
A:

Yes I did.

Q: Did you ask the McPhersons to move from the
condominium unit?
A: I asked them if it would be possible for them
to do so yes.
Qj

What was the reason that you asked them to

move?
A:
My son Jeff had approached me and had
requested to buy the condominium from me because he was
going through a divorce at the present time and it
would be convenient for him to move into the
condominium soon so I approached them and asked them if
they would move out sooner that anticipated.
Q: Would it have benefited you if your son had
purchased the condominium unit?
A:

Obviously.

Q:
So the McPhersons
accommodation to you; correct?
A:

moving

out

was

an

That is correct.

(Trial Transcript, p. 37 line 4 - p. 38, line 23).
c.

Application Of Law To Evidence.
Vaughn Belnap in his Appellate Brief concedes that the

evidence clearly establishes the McPhersons accommodated him by
vacating

the condominium unit.

However, Vaughn Belnap still

argues that the trial Court's finding that the bailment was for
18

the mutual

benefit

of the parties

is not

supported by the

evidence.
Contrary

to

Vaughn

supports the trial Courts

Belnap's

that

the

evidence

finding that the bailment was for

mutual benefit of the parties.
undisputed

contention,

McPhersons1

Both parties testified and it is
agreement

to

move

from

the

condominium unit prior to the expiration of the lease benefitted
Vaughn Belnap by allowing him to proceed with an alleged sale of
his condominium unit.

However, prior to agreeing to move from

the condominium unit, Vaughn Belnap agreed to store McPherson's
furniture until such time as they had accommodations that could
facilitate the furniture.

Thus, Vaughn Belnap's agreement to

store the subject property benefited both parties.
agreement

benefited

Vaughn

Belnap by making

The bailment

it possible for

McPhersons to move out of the condominium unit which benefited
Vaughn Belnap by allowing him to consummate the alleged sale.
Further, having the furniture available helped Vaughn Belnap in
furthering the subsequent use of the condominium unit by his son.

Ill
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S IMPOSITION OF THE
PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE.
A.

Applicable law.

It is well established that in a bailment
benefit

of

the

parties, the bailee

is required

for a mutual
to exercise

ordinary care.

Anniston Lincoln Mercury v. Mayse. 341 S.2d 949

(Ala. 1977) .

Ordinary care is that care that a reasonable and
19

prudent person would exercise in dealing with his or her own
property,

Verenhoff Corp, v. Aetna Insurance Co., 366 S.2d 457

(Fla. App. 1976).

In analyzing whether a bailee has breached the

standard of care, the courts unanimously agree that in a bailment
for the mutual benefit of the parties, the bailor can establish a
presumption of bailee's negligence, and thus a breach of the
bailment agreement, by proving that the property was delivered to
the bailee in good condition and the bailee either (1)

failed to

return it; or (2) returned the property in damaged condition.
Staheli v. Farmers Cooperative of Southern Utah. 655 P.2d 680
(Utah 1980).

The leading Utah case concerning the imposition of

the presumption of negligence in the contexts of a bailment is
the Staheli case.

The facts in Staheli are as follows:

The Defendant was engaged in the business of providing grain
storage to local farmers.

In the year in question, the Defendant

did not have enough storage to accommodate the requirements of
the area farmers, consequently, it leased a large potato cellar
from a cellar and storage company to provide additional temporary
storage capacity.

The portion of the cellar which was not leased

to the Defendant was retained
cellar.

and used by the owner of the

The farmers who stored their grain also had unlimited

access to this potato cellar where the grain was being stored.
Subsequently,

a

fire

in

the

cellar

damaged

the

grain

and

Plaintiff, Staheli brought suit against the Farmer's Co-Op.

The

trial Court entered judgment in favor of the Defendant Farmer's
Co-Op finding that the presumption of negligence did not imply
20

under the facts of the case because the facts did not show that
Defendant had exclusive control over the potato cellar where the
grain was stored.
On appeal; Plaintiff argued that it was entitled to the
presumption of negligence and the Defendant Co-Op was negligent
as a matter of law and that the Defendant Co-Op did not rebut
that

presumption.

presumption

The

Defendant

Co-Op

argued

that

the

of negligence should not arise and therefore the

burden of proof did not shift to it because it did not have
exclusive possession over the bailed goods.
The Court in Staheli, in determining whether the presumption
of negligence should arise under the circumstances explained the
rationale

for the general

rule regarding

negligence being imposed on the bailee.

the presumption of
The Court stated as

follows:
The policy that sustains a presumption arises from
the practical considerations that one who is in the
possession of another's property is in a better
position to control the conditions that may cause loss
or damage and to know, or at least be able to ascertain
the cause of any actual loss or damage. A predicate of
the presumption therefore, is that the bailee be in
exclusive possession, and it is that proposition that
gives logical force to the presumption....
Not withstanding the presumption, the law does not
make the bailee for hire a guarantor; it is a rule of
fault with which we deal.
Thus, the presumption
allocates the burden of proof to the party most likely
to have access to th evidence, and, in the absence of
evidence, places liability on the party most likely to
have been able to avert the loss.
Id. at 683.
This Court in Staheli went on to conclude that as the record
21

did not establish the Defendant Co-op had the exclusive right and
power of control over the grain in the cellar, the presumption of
negligence

should

not

apply.

This

Court

in coming to its

decision specifically noted that the trial Court found that:
Plaintiffs as well as the agents of Defendant had
unlimited access to the said potato pit either through
the doors on the end temporarily leased by the
Defendant or through the doors on the end retained by
the owner, neither which was locked.
Id. at 684.
B.

The Evidence Support The Trial Court's
Finding That The Property At The Time Of
Delivery Was Under The Exclusive Control Of
Defendant Vaughn Belnap.

In the present case, the trial Court made the following
finding with respect to the application of the presumption of
negligence in this case.
The Court believes that under the fact situation
of the case, bailment was created.
Plaintiffs
delivered to Defendant Vaughn Belnap, not Jeffrey
Belnap, the furniture with the express understanding
that the furniture would be returned to Plaintiffs.
(Finding of Fact, R. 203 7)
1.

As discussed above, Edward McPherson in his testimony

indicates that he delivered the property to Vaughn Belnap and not
Jeffrey Belnap.

(Trial Transcript p. 10, lines 5-22; p. 32,

lines 1-13).
2.
into

The evidence further shows that the agreement entered

with

McPherson

respect

to

the

bailed

property

and Vaughn Belnap and not Jeffrey

was

between

the

Belnap his son.

(Trial Transcript p. 11, lines 21 - p. 12 line 7; p. 14, lines 614; p. 32 lines 1-13).
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3.

Vaughn Belnap was the sole owner of the condominium unit

at the time the property was delivered.

(Trial transcript p. 6,

lines 17-19; p. 37 lines 13-23).
4.

McPhersons did not have access to property within the

condominium unit.

In order to attempt to gain access to their

furniture, they contacted Vaughn Belnap.

(Trial Transcript p.

35, line 19 - p. 36, line 4).
B. Application Of Law To The Evidence.
In

the

present

case,

Vaughn

Belnap

attempts

to

void

liability by claiming that the property stored in a condominium
unit was being used by his son Jeffrey Belnap and therefore he
did not have exclusive possession of the property.

Vaughn Belnap

claims that under the Staheli case, the trial court erred in
applying the presumption of negligence.
In determining whether a party has exclusive possession, the
Court should look at who had actual or constructive control over
the bailed property at the time it was initially delivered, not
what subsequently happened to the property when it was under the
bailee's control.

In the present case, the evidence shows that

at the time the property was delivered by the McPhersons, it was
delivered

to Vaughn

Belnap

and not Jeffrey Belnap.

As the

evidence shows, Vaughn Belnap agreed to store the furniture in
the condominium unit and indicated that the furniture would be
safe there even though his son intended to occupy the unit.
Thus,

it was Vaughn Belnap who turned over the care of the

property in his condominium to his son, Jeffrey.
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As stated by

the trial court in its Memorandum Decision, dated January 4,
1991:
In this case, as the Court pointed out to counsel
at the time of oral argument, the bailee should not be
able to escape liability by turning over the care and
security of the property to an employee, representative
or agent•
Vaughn Belnap elected his son as the
caretaker of the furniture and therefore must assume
responsibility for its safety.
(R. 134 and 135)•
Further, the present case is distinguishable from the facts
of the Staheli case.

In the present case, unlike in the Staheli

case, the property in question was delivered to Vaughn Belnap and
stored in a condominium owned exclusive by Vaughn Belnap.

The

facts further show that McPhersons, unlike the farmers in the
Staheli case, did not have access to the furniture which was
stored in Vaughn Belnap's condominium.

The facts show that when

McPhersons wanted to gain access to their property they contacted
Vaughn Belnap.

Therefore, the facts in the present case, unlike

in the Staheli case, indicate that Vaughn Belnap had exclusive
control over the bailed property.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT VAUGHN
BELNAP DID NOT REBUT THE PRESUMPTION OF
NEGLIGENCE.

A.

Applicable Law.

Once it is determined that a bailment for mutual benefit was
entered into, and the bailed goods lost, damaged or destroyed, a
presumption of negligence is imposed on the bailee.

The bailee

then must come forth with evidence that the loss or damage was
not

due

to

the

bailee's

negligence.
24

Staheli

v.

Farmers

Cooperative of Southern Utah, 655 P.2d 680, 682 (1982).
B.

Evidence
Findings.

Support

The

Trial

In the present case, the trial court

Court's
found that Vaughn

Belnap failed to rebut the presumption that the loss of furniture
was not a result of his negligence.

(Findings of Fact, Para. 9;

Conclusions of Law Para. 3, R. 204-205).

The only evidence

presented concerning the exercise of care by Vaughn Belnap is as
follows:
Q:
You lived in the condominium unit prior to
September, 1980, is that correct?
A:

That's correct.

Q:

Did you have locks on the doors?

A:

Yes, normal locks and dead bolt doors.

Q:

I assume that the windows were in place?

A:

Yes.

Q:

Normal security?

A:

Yes.

Q: Was there any difference in the security at
the time you lived in it and when Jeff lived in it?
A:

No.

(Trial transcript p. 68, lines 21-25; p. 69, lines 1-8).
In addition, Jeffrey Belnap claimed that even though 18
months had passed, he remembered locking the door on the day the
property was stolen.

(Trial transcript, p. 51, line 23 - p. 52,

line 10).
C.

Application Of Law To The Evidence.

Vaughn

Belnap

contends that
25

even

if the presumption

of

negligence was correctly imposed by the trial Court, under clear
weight

of

evidence

evidence
that

he rebutted

Vaughn

Belnap

that presumption.

can

point

to

to

The only
support

his

contention is his claim that he had locks on the windows and
doors when he lived at the condominium prior to the McPhersons
and the testimony of his son, Jeffrey Belnap, who claims that
even though

it has been over

18 months

since the date the

property was allegedly stolen, he remembers locking the doors on
that particular day.
questionable.

As is evident, this testimony is highly

Further,

presumption of negligence.

it

is

insufficient

to

rebut

the

As stated by the trial court in its

January 4, 1991 Memorandum Decision:
In this case Vaughn Belnap contends that the
furniture was stolen from the condominium, but there is
no evidence of forcible entry.
The only evidence
presented was the self-serving statement of Jeffrey
Belnap that the doors and windows were locked when he
left the premises.
(R. 135).
CONCLUSION
As is shown, the trial court's award of judgment to the
McPhersons is supported by the evidence.

The evidence shows that

McPhersons left their property with Vaughn Belnap and not Jeffrey
Belnap at a condominium unit owned by Vaughn Belnap.
the

facts

show

that the agreement

entered

parties was a bailment for mutual benefit.
testimony

admitted

that

he

benefited

Further,

into between the

Vaughn Belnap in his
from

the

McPhersons1

agreement to move from the condominium unit which could only be
accomplished

if

Vaughn

Belnap
26

would

agree

to

store

the

McPhersons1 property.

Further, the facts show that at the time

the property was delivered, it was delivered to Vaughn Belnap and
not Jeffrey Belnap.

Jeffrey Belnap was not involved in the

negotiation for the storage of the property.

Only after the

property was delivered did Vaughn Belnap turn the care of the
property over to his son, Jeffrey Belnap.

Finally, evidence

supports the Court's conclusion that Vaughn Belnap failed to
rebut the presumption of negligence.
/B

RESPECTFULLY submitted this

day of July, 1991.

THOMPSON, HATCH, MORTON & SKEEN

scorms. KUNKEL
Attorney for Appellees
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
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v
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true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellees was
mailed in the United States mail, postage prepaid, to:
Larry G. Reed
Crowther & Reed
455 South 300 East, #300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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ADDENDUM

Memorandum Decision, Dated September 14, 1990

Memorandum Decision [re: Motion for New Trial], Dated January 2,
1991

Order [Denying Motion for New Trial and Objections to Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law], dated January 24, 1991

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, dated January 24, 1991
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

L»V;Jou> wtes'A

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JOSEPH EDWARD McPHERSON and
JOAN ELISSA McPHERSON,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CIVIL NO.

890902949 PD

Plaintiffs,
vs.
VAUGHN BELNAP and
JEFFREY BELNAP,
Defendants.

This case was tried on August
Court, without a jury.
and

represented

by

1990 before the

Plaintiff Joseph McPherson was present

Scott

McPherson was not present.

S. Kunkel.

Plaintiff Joan Elissa

The defendants, Vaughn Belnap and

Jeffrey Belnap were present and represented by Larry G. Reed.
The

Court

heard

testimony

of

the

witnesses,

admitted

documentary evidence, heard oral argument and took the matter
under advisement.

The Court now being fully advised, enters

its ruling.
This case arose as a result of the defendant Vaughn Belnap
leasing

to the plaintiffs

a condominium

months.

During the term of the lease defendant, Vaughn Belnap,

had an opportunity to sell the condominium.

for a term of six

He requested that

MCPHERSON V. BELNAP

PAGE THREE

MEMORANDUM DECISION

the furniture as agreed.

Defendant Vaughn Belnap failed to

prove that the loss of the furniture was not as a result of his
negligence.
As a result of defendant Vaughn Belnap being unable to
return the furniture to the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs suffered
damages in the sum of $6,000.00, together with their costs and
interest.
The Court refers the parties to plaintiff's Trial Brief for
additional reasons in support of its decision.
Plaintiffs'
Conclusions

of

counsel
Law,

shall

and

prepare

Judgment

in

Findings

of

accordance

Fact and
with

this

Memorandum Decision.
Dated this

day of September, 1990.

^JL A (RJLi
ApHjjr A . ROKICH
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

F!L£Q DSSTfJiCT C5U«riT
Third Judicial District

JAN

2 1991

SALT LAKE COGNTp

-—

By.
O&puty CWf k

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JOSEPH EDWARD McPHERSON and

MEMORANDUM DECISION

JOAN ELISSA MCPHERSON,

CIVIL NO.

890902949 PD

Plaintiffs,
vs.
VAUGHN BELNAP and
JEFFREY BELNAP,
Defendants.

Defendant Vaughn Belnap's Motion for New Trial or Direct
Entry of Judgment in Favor of Defendant, Motion to Tax Bill of
Costs, Objection to form of Judgment and proposed Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law were heard on the 2 6th day of
November,
Kunkel.
The
parties,

1990.

Plaintiffs

were

represented

by

Scott

S.

Defendant was represented by Larry G. Reed.
Court
heard

advisement.

read

the

oral

Memoranda

argument,

and

filed
took

by
the

the

respective

matter

under

The Court now rules.

The first issue the Court will address is whether or not
defendant Vaughn Belnap was negligent in failing to return the
plaintiffs' furniture since there was a bailment for the mutual
benefit of the parties.

MCPHERSON V. BELNAP

PAGE THREE

MEMORANDUM DECISION

The findings in the Staheli case were:
All of the parties were aware of the easy
access to all parts of the potato pit at all
times crucial herein and most, if not all, along
with third party owner of the potato pit and
others were in and out of the premises as they
desired or as their business dictated.
Doors
were left open and little or no concern was
expressed by anyone concerning the other stored
equipment or materials, which plaintiffs would
now
have
this
court
find
constituted
an
unreasonable risk of the loss that actually
occurred or that the defendant had responsibility
under the law to control transients at or near
the
premises,
which
plaintiffs
further
hypothesized may have caused the fire.
The facts in this case and the Staheli case in this Court's
opinion are not similar; therefore, the Court cannot come to
the same conclusion as Vaughn Belnap has reached.
The Staheli case held that "one who is in possession of
another's property

is

in a better position

to

control the

conditions that may cause the loss and to know, or at least to
be able to ascertain the cause of any actual loss or damage."
A predicate of the presumption, therefore, is that the bailee
be in exclusive possession, and it is that proposition that
gives logical force to the presumption.
In this case, as the Court pointed out to counsel at the
time of oral argument, the bailee should not be able to escape

MCPHERSON V. BELNAP

PAGE FIVE

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiffs' counsel shall prepare an Order in accordance
with this Memorandum Decision.
Dated this z

_day of January, 1991.

:

^

A

pOHN A. ROKICH
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

1,...-

JAMES E. MORTON, #3738
SCOTT S. KUNKEL, #5303
THOMPSON, HATCH, MORTON & SKEEN
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
1245 Brickyard Road, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Telephone: (801) 484-3000

.ii.-j.K.izi District

JAN 2 4 1991
Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JOSEPH EDWARD MCPHERSON and
JOAN ELISSA MCPHERSON,
Plaintiffs,

]
]
;i ORDER

vs.

]

VAUGHAN BELNAP and JEFFREY
BELNAP,
Defendants.

| Civil No. 890902949 PD
;
) Judge John A. Rokich
]

Defendant

Belnap's Motion

Vaughan

for New Trial or

Entry of Judgment in favor of Defendnat, Motion to Tax Costs and
Objection to Form

of Judgment came on regularly

for hearing

before the Honorable John A. Rokich of the above-entitled Court
on November

26, 1990, Larry G. Reed appearing

on behalf of

Defendant Vaughan Belnap and Scott S. Kunkel appearing on behalf
of Plaintiffs, Joseph Edward McPherson and Joan Elissa McPhersonBased upon the oral argument of counsel, study of the various
motions and memoranda submitted on behalf of the parties, and
good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
1,

Defendant Vaughan Belnap's Motion for a New Trial

or Entry of Judgment in his favor is denied.

JAMES E. MORTON #3738
SCOTT S. KUNKEL #53 03
THOMPSON, HATCH, MORTON & SKEEN
Attorneys For Plaintiffs
1245 Brickyard Road, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Telephone (801) 484-3000

Third Judicial District

JAN 2 4 1991
SALT LAKE OOUM-^v
Dfc+sul/ OlOfK

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JOSEPH EDWARD McPHERSON and
JOAN ELISSA McPHERSON,
Plaintiffs,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
VAUGHAN BELNAP and
JEFFREY BELNAP,

Civil No. 890902949 PD

Defendants.

Judge John A. Rokich

This case, came on regularly for a non-jury trial on August
30, 1990, before The Honorable John A. Rokich, District Court
Judge.

Plaintiffs

Joseph

Edward

McPherson

and

Joan

Elissa

McPherson, were represented by Scott S. Kunkel of Hatch, Morton &
Skeen and Defendant Vaughan Belnap was represented by Larry G.
Reed of Crowther & Reed.

The Court having heard testimony of

witnesses, reviewed documentary evidence and argument of counsel
and being

fully advised

in the premises, and for good cause

appearing, now makes and enters the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

In or about September, 1988, Plaintiffs entered into a

lease agreement with Defendant Vaughan Belnap wherein Vaughan

entry into the Condominium•
5.

At all relevant times during the events giving rise to

this action, Vaughan Belnap was the owner of the Condominium, and
Plaintiff's personal property that was left at the Condominium
and in the care, custody and control of Vaughan Belnap.
6.

The items of personal property that Vaughan Belnap did

not return to Plaintiffs are as follows:
Purchase
Price

Item
Mitsubishi 35" television
Cannondale Mud Bike
Fat Chance Bike
G.E. Microwave
Couch, Loveseat, two chairs
and one ottoman made of
elephant hide

$ 2,900.00
$
600.00
$ 1,485.00
$
3 00.00

Persian Rug

$

7.

Date
Purchased
1985
5/87
5/87

$ 6,000.00
700.00

The Court believes that under the fact situation of the

case, a bailment was created.

Plaintiffs delivered to Defendant

Vaughan Belnap, and not Jeffrey Belnap, the furniture with the
express understanding that the furniture would be returned to
Plaintiffs.
8.

The Court further believes that bailment was for the

mutual benefit
Defendant

of both parties.

Vaughen

Belnap

in

The Plaintiff
furthering

the

accommodated
sale

of

the

Condominium by moving out prior to the expiration of the lease
and

by

allowing

Vaughan

Belnap

to

use

the

furniture

in

furtherance of the sale of the Condominium, to his son who had no
furniture.
9.

Finally, the Court concludes that since this was a case
3

failing to return the furniture, as agreed.

Defendant Vaughan

Belnap failed to prove that the loss of the furniture was not the
result of his negligence.
4.

As a result of the Defendant Vaughan Belnap breach of

the bailment agreement by failing to return the furniture to
Plaintiffs,

Plaintiffs

suffered

damages

in

the

amount

of

$6,000.00, together with their costs and interest.
5.

Interest on $6,000.00 in damages suffered by Plaintiffs

shall accrue at the rate of 10% per annum prior to judment and
12% after judgment and will begin to run from December 15, 1988
until the time the judgment is paid in full.
6.

Additional reasons in support of the Court's decision

is contained within the Plaintiff's trial brief.
DATED this

j£ <^ day of

^T^jucgn^

1990.

BY THE^COURT:
1
AJ1

#

(Jl^i

THEJHONORABLE JOHN A. ROKICH
District Court Judge
APPROVE AS TO FORM:

LARRY REED
Attorney for Defendant Vaughn Belnap
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